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The Problem of Coerced Consent: When 
Voluntary Departure Isn’t So Voluntary 
Nicolas A. Novy* 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.  One of the first duties of 
government is to afford that protection.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Voluntary departure and stipulated removals are intended to be useful 
tools for foreign nationals who do not wish to contest their citizenship.  
Often, this allows the individual an opportunity to be reunited with their 
family more expeditiously, in lieu of being detained for several months 
awaiting an inevitable decision of removal from an immigration judge.  
What the foreign national often does not realize, however, is that the same 
laborious process they seek to avoid is also the necessary backstop enacted 
by Congress to protect their constitutional rights.  If a foreign national 
voluntarily chooses to forego a hearing and their right to present evidence, 
the Constitution is clearly not offended.  If, on the other hand, immigration 
officers coerce the foreign national to forego those rights, due process 
concerns begin to surface.  Most importantly, a foreign national attempting 
to seek redress after being coerced into removal now has none, as they are 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States and its federal courts.  This 
means foreign nationals are merely one signature away from immediate 
removal, often without the ability to return and challenge the tactics used 
by immigration officers to secure their consent. 
Part I of this Article describes an overview of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), the statutory framework by which expedited 
removals such as voluntary departure and stipulated removal exist, and the 
benefits of these procedures for both the foreign national and the 
government when executed in connection with congressional intent.2  
 
*  © 2019 Nicolas A. Novy.  Associate, Dechert LLP.  Former law clerk in the United States District 
Court, Southern District of Texas for the Honorable Rolando Olvera.  J.D., 2014, Villanova University 
School of Law; B.A., 2011, Catholic University of America.   
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 2. For an overview of the INA, see infra Part I. 
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Parts II and III discuss potential due process concerns during removal 
proceedings when foreign nationals have been coerced into giving up 
rights they are unaware of through misinformation, language barriers, and 
lack of legal resources.3  Part IV explores the legal rights of foreign 
nationals, as well as possible legal actions at their disposal if their 
constitutional rights are violated.4  Part V argues that courts should not shy 
away from extending a federal cause of action to those who suffer 
constitutional violations because of coerced consent tactics, especially 
when the individual has no other avenue for legal redress.5  Finally, Part 
VI suggests that simply extending a civil cause of action is insufficient to 
cure the underlying problem, and courts and Congress alike should take 
further steps in protecting the due process rights of individuals in the 
removal process.6 
I.  THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: AN OVERVIEW 
The INA is a comprehensive body of immigration law enacted by 
Congress in 1952.7  When an individual is believed to be present in the 
United States unlawfully, they may be subject to formal removal 
proceedings under section 1229a.8  Under such removal proceedings, an 
evidentiary hearing is conducted to determine the admissibility and 
 
 3. For examples of due process violations by immigration officials, see infra Parts II & III. 
 4. For a discussion of the available avenues of recourse that the foreign national may have at 
their disposal if their constitutional or statutory rights are violated, see infra Part IV. 
 5. For a discussion advocating the extension of a Bivens cause of action to coerced consent 
violations, see infra Part V. 
 6. For a concluding discussion on the effects of coerced consent violations and a few suggested 
remedial measures, see infra Part VI. 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101–1537 (2012). 
 8. Id. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this section 
shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the 
United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.  Nothing in this 
section shall affect proceedings conducted pursuant to section [1228 of this title].”).  However, if an 
individual concedes deportability or admits to an aggravated felony, expedited removal proceedings 
may be commenced.  Id. § 1228(a)(3)(A) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney 
General shall provide for the initiation and, to the extent possible, the completion of removal 
proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof, in the case of any alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony before the alien’s release from incarceration for the underlying aggravated 
felony.”).  The alien may also be subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which permits  
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to remove an alien without formal removal proceedings 
if they “(1) ‘are physically present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled,’ (2) are 
discovered ‘within 100 air miles’ of the United States border, and (3) cannot establish that they have 
been ‘physically present in the U.S.’ for the fourteen days prior to the encounter with immigration 
authorities.”  United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Designating 
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877–01, 48880 (Aug. 11, 2004)). 
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removability of the individual before an immigration judge.9  Under the 
INA, the individual subject to removal proceedings has the right to 
competent counsel, the right to examine the evidence against them, the 
right to present their own evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to 
post a bond to avoid detention before removal proceedings.10  After the 
hearing, and in the event the immigration judge determines removal is 
proper, the individual may still petition for asylum, cancellation of 
removal, and adjustment of status.11 
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amended the INA and established 
streamlined deportation procedures that permit the deportation of certain 
individuals without a hearing before an immigration judge.12  Voluntary 
departure and stipulated removal are just a few ways that the government 
diverts foreign nationals away from adjudication for the sake of 
efficiency.13  In either case, the government must obtain the foreign 
national’s consent to forego formal removal proceedings—and such 
 
 9. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive 
evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.  The immigration 
judge may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.  The 
immigration judge shall have authority (under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General) to 
sanction by civil money penalty any action (or inaction) in contempt of the judge’s proper exercise of 
authority under this chapter.”). 
 10. See id. §1229a(b)(4) (providing that during removal proceedings, the alien has the right to 
competent counsel, the right to examine evidence against them, present their own evidence on their 
behalf, and cross-examine witnesses presented by the government); see also id. § 1229a(c)(5) 
(requiring judges to inform aliens of their right to appeal the immigration judge’s decision regarding 
removability); id. § 1226(a)(2) (providing the right to post a bond to avoid detention prior to said 
hearing in the discretion of the Attorney General).  
 11. Id. § 1158(b) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney General to 
grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a refugee, i.e., an alien who has been persecuted or has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution in his or her former country of residence); id. § 1229b(a)(1)–
(3) (providing the Attorney General with discretionary authority to cancel the removal of an alien who 
had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for five years, resided legally in the United 
States for seven consecutive years, and has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as defined 
in INA); id. § 1255 (providing the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General with 
discretionary authority to adjust an alien’s status to that of a lawful permanent resident without the 
alien having to obtain a visa from a consular office abroad). 
 12. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: 
THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www 
.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deportations-
united-states [https://perma.cc/HWY6-QWWJ] [hereinafter REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE]. 
 13. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 636 (2009) (“What could be more efficient than funneling certain individuals away 
from adjudication?  Waiting times are minimal and costs are low.  The effort and expense of elaborate 
procedures are avoided. . . .  These savings affect both those diverted from and those who do access 
the immigration adjudication system.  For those diverted, the process is swift and cheap.  For those 
inside the system, the process for them is swifter because so many millions are kept out.”). 
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consent must be made knowingly and voluntarily.14 
Stipulated removal occurs when the foreign national explicitly waives 
their rights to adjudicate their deportation, including any right to a hearing 
and an appeal, for a final order of removal that is effective immediately.15  
The stipulated removal order must be signed by the foreign national and 
an immigration judge.16  Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b)(6), the stipulation 
must include “[a] statement that the alien understands the consequences of 
the stipulated request and that the alien enters the request voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently.”17  If the foreign national is not represented 
by an attorney, the immigration judge is required to make a separate 
finding that the individual’s waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.18  The benefit of stipulated removal to the foreign national is 
an accelerated removal process, without the necessity of possible 
confinement while awaiting a formal hearing.19 
Voluntary departure is a similar form of relief that permits a foreign 
national to voluntarily depart the United States in lieu of formal removal 
proceedings or a formal removal order.20  Voluntary departure may be 
available before the commencement of a formal removal proceeding or 
after its conclusion if the foreign national is found deportable.21  The 
practice was originally developed by administrative officers in the absence 
 
 14. See United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885, 896 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[D]ue process requires that 
an alien be provided an individual explanation that is competently translated ‘when he sign[s] the 
form’ . . . beyond an en masse explanation”); Maria S. v. Garza, No. 1:13-CV-108, 2015 WL 4394745, 
at *14 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015) (holding that “an involuntary or coerced waiver of rights is not 
effective and constitutes a deprivation of procedural due process” (citing Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 
395 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 10, 2005))).  
 15. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2019). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. § 1003.25(b)(6). 
 18. Id. § 1003.25(b); see also Gomez, 757 F.3d at 898 (holding immigration judge erred in finding 
foreign national’s consent was made knowingly and voluntarily by simply relying on the foreign 
national’s signature on the consent form because said evidence by itself is insufficient). 
 19. Family, supra note 13, at 615–17 (explaining that the “only acknowledged benefit [of 
stipulated removal] to the foreign national is a speedy removal”). 
 20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012). 
 21. See id. § 1229c(a)(1) (“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United 
States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to proceedings under section 
1229a of this title or prior to the completion of such proceedings . . . .”); see also Marc E. Tarlock, Voluntary 
Departure and the Right to Reopen Removal Proceedings on the Merits, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 613, 613 
(2007) (“Once initiated, removal proceedings take place before an immigration judge . . . .  If the alien is 
found removable at the conclusion of the hearing, he may request voluntary departure in lieu of formal 
deportation.”); JENNIFER LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS (2011), https://www.nilc 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Deportation-Without-Due-Process-2011-09.pdf[https://perma.cc/6NGA-
AC64].  Technically speaking, “voluntary return” is when a foreign national elects to depart prior to the 
commencement of formal removal proceedings and “voluntary departure” is relief granted by an immigration 
judge during the course of removal proceedings.  Courts and scholars alike, however, use the terms 
interchangeably.  Therefore, this Article will not make it a point of significant distinction.   
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of express statutory provisions and first codified in the Alien Registration 
Act of 1940.22  Unlike a formal order of removal or a stipulated order of 
removal, however, voluntary departure does not bar future entry into the 
United States.23  On the other hand, it also does not require an immigration 
judge to make a finding that the individual’s consent was made knowingly 
and voluntarily.24  The administrative ease of securing voluntary departure 
may help explain its staggering growth as one of the most popular forms 
of removal since 2004.25 
In either case, voluntary departure and stipulated removal allow the 
government and the foreign national to agree on a quid pro quo.26  From 
the government’s perspective, a voluntary departure is less costly and 
more efficient when administered as intended.27  Likewise, the foreign 
national receives several benefits such as avoiding extended detention and 
 
 22. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 671–73 
(repealed 1952); see also 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 6 IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 74.02 
(rev. ed. 2019) (explaining that prior to the formal enactment of the voluntary departure provisions in 
1940, such relief was available from administrative immigration officers). 
 23. Family, supra note 13, at 615 (“From the foreign national’s perspective, voluntary departure 
is more attractive than a removal order because it does not bar future entry into the United States.  
Removal orders carry bars from entering into the United States that last from five to twenty years.”).  
But see infra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that in certain circumstances, voluntary 
departure can have devastating effects when a foreign national is legally present in the United States 
on a temporary basis). 
 24. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (requiring no finding of fact by an immigration judge that 
the foreign national has voluntarily and knowingly surrendered their right to formal removal 
proceedings for voluntary departure), with supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text (requiring 
immigration judge to confirm foreign national’s waiver is knowing and voluntary for stipulated 
removal orders). 
 25. See SARA CAMPOS & GUILLERMO CANTOR, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, DEPORTATIONS IN 
THE DARK: LACK OF PROCESS AND INFORMATION IN THE REMOVAL OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS (2017), 
https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/deportations_in_the_dark.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4AGU-XQEJ]. 
 26. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 11 (2008); see also Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 194 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“This statutory scheme reveals Congress’[s] intention to offer an alien a specific 
benefit—exemption from the ordinary bars on subsequent relief—in return for a quick departure at no 
cost to the government.”). 
 27. Dada, 554 U.S. at 11 (“[T]he alien’s agreement to leave voluntarily expedites the departure 
process and avoids the expense of deportation—including procuring necessary documents and 
detaining the alien pending deportation.  The Government also eliminates some of the costs and 
burdens associated with litigation over the departure.”); see also Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 614 
(8th Cir. 2004) (“For the Government, voluntary departure may expedite and reduce the cost of 
removal.”); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Voluntary departure serves the 
practical goals of reducing the costs associated with deporting individuals from the United States and 
providing a mechanism for illegal aliens to leave the country without being subject to the stigma or 
bars to future relief that are part of the sanction of deportation.”); Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 
515, 521 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining voluntary departure is to prevent the practice “of using the federal 
courts in a seemingly endless series of meritless or dilatory tactics designed to stall [an alien’s] 
departure from the country as long as possible”). 
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the ability to “sidestep some of the penalties attendant to deportation.”28  
These forms of accelerated removal, however, are only valid insofar as 
there is mutual assent between the parties.29  Thus, when the foreign 
national voluntarily and knowingly chooses to forego their rights to formal 
removal proceedings in lieu of a more efficient and cost-effective 
agreement with the government, the agreement is valid and both parties 
benefit.30 
II. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS: BEFORE AND AFTER 
LOPEZ-MENDOZA 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is primarily 
responsible for the administration of the voluntary departure process, by 
and through border patrol agents and immigration officers.  In 1984, the 
Supreme Court articulated its faith in the legitimacy of the internal 
regulations of the INS to protect foreign nationals from constitutional 
violations in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.31  In Lopez-Mendoza, however, the 
Court noted that its conclusion “might change, if there developed good 
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were 
widespread.”32  In the many years following the Lopez-Mendoza decision 
and before September 11, the United States was revered as one of the most 
open, and foreign-national friendly, countries to visit, travel, and reside.33  
 
 28. See Dada, 554 U.S. at 11 (explaining benefits to immigrant who elects to voluntarily depart 
instead of going through removal proceedings). 
 29. For a discussion of voluntary departure in the context of contract law, see infra note 177 and 
accompanying text. 
 30. See David S. Rubenstein, Restoring the Quid Pro Quo of Voluntary Departure, 44 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2007) (“If the alien abides by the terms of the agreement, voluntary departure affords 
quid pro quo benefits to both the Government and the alien.  For its part, the Government avoids the 
costs and burdens of forced removal and potentially those associated with protracted litigation.  In 
exchange, the alien: (1) may depart to any destination of his choice; (2) may do so at a convenient 
time within the prescribed departure period; (3) avoids the stigma of forced removal; and (4) most 
importantly, avoids an order of removal and the attendant bars to readmission into the United States 
that would otherwise attach if the alien were removed by the Government.”); see also Romualdo P. 
Eclavea, Annotation, Right of Alien Who is Under Deportation Proceedings to Depart Voluntarily 
from United States Under § 244(e) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(e)), 44 
A.L.R. Fed. 574, 3 (1979) (“It has been expressly recognized that the relief of voluntary departure 
under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(e) may be an important benefit to a deportable alien, because voluntary 
departure avoids the stigma of deportation, enables the alien to select his own destination, and 
facilitates the possibility of his return to the United States.”). 
 31. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding exclusionary rule does not 
apply to immigration proceedings). 
 32. Id. 
 33. EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN BORDER: TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION AND 
SECURITY SINCE 9/11, at 4–5 (2008) (“On September 10, 2001, the United States was the most open, 
and some might have said most naïve, country in the world. . . .  Government scrutiny for the more 
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Such openness had ushered in a golden age of globalization by effectively 
recruiting the most talented, intelligent, and creative people from all over 
the world.34  But in the aftermath of one of the most devastating terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil, there was a desperate desire to prevent another one.35  
The INS and the FBI had few leads as to suspects immediately after the 
attack, and what, if any, attack was coming next.36  As a result, the agencies 
implored a broad and aggressive immigration crackdown on all foreign 
nationals—knocking on doors of heavily populated Arab communities and 
detaining millions of foreign nationals.37  Admittedly, the agencies knew 
these aggressive tactics would harm innocent individuals, but viewed it as 
“unavoidable collateral damage that was an acceptable price if it disrupted 
potential terrorist activity.”38  The INS and border officials alike 
desperately wanted to demonstrate their commitment to keeping America 
safe and immigration statistics were exceptionally easy to measure.39  
Commentators have suggested that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the U.S. government became “obsessed” with these metrics 
and began using them as a way of proving the government’s success in 
keeping “bad people out.”40  As a result, the critical distinction between 
antiterrorism enforcement and immigration enforcement has become 
 
than 7 million visas granted each year to foreign visitors was cursory, while another 11 million 
travelers from Europe and nearly 25 million visitors from Canada and Mexico crossed with virtually 
no scrutiny at all.”). 
 34. AMY CHUA, DAY OF EMPIRE xxiii (2007) (“[A]t any given historical moment, the most 
valuable human capital the world has to offer—whether in the form of intelligence, physical strength, 
skill, knowledge, creativity, networks, commercial innovation or technological invention—is never to 
be found in one locale or within any one ethnic or religious group.  To pull away from its rivals on a 
global scale, a society must pull itself and motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of 
ethnicity, religion, or background.”); see also ALDEN, supra note 33, at 20–21 (explaining the United 
States’ biggest commercial advantage had been its openness and the importation of talent, intelligence, 
and workforce from its immigrants). 
 35. ALDEN, supra note 33, at 5 (“[I]n the aftermath of the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, 
which had left nearly three thousand people dead and their grieving families behind, the risks [of an 
open immigration policy] suddenly appeared vastly to outweigh the benefits”). 
 36. See id. at 80–87.  In fact, the U.S. government knew almost nothing about millions of foreign 
nationals residing in the United States at the time of the attack, including the hijackers themselves.  Id. 
at 5. 
 37. Id. at 84–88. 
 38. Id. at 87–88; see also Karen Gullo, Aschroft Discusses New Powers, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 
2001, 7:54 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011025/aponline195409_000.h 
tm?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/U8TG-2NNN] (discussing former Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s following statement: “Let the terrorists among us be warned.  If you overstay your visas 
even by one day, we will arrest you; if you violate a local law, we will hope that you will, and work 
to make sure that you are put in jail and be kept in custody as long as possible” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 39. ALDEN, supra note 33, at 292. 
 40. Id.  
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blurred.41 
Since Lopez-Mendoza and September 11, research suggests that 
immigration officials have regularly disregarded the internal procedures 
of the INA in favor of shortcuts that violate due process.42  The Ninth 
Circuit has recognized that “an ‘evident systematic policy and practice of 
[F]ourth [A]mendment violations’ by INS” exists.43  Commentators have 
suggested that constitutional violations committed by immigration officers 
are rarely penalized and the internal review process of DHS does little to 
deter their unconstitutional conduct.44  Without legitimate internal 
deterrence, formal allegations of misconduct are significantly 
underreported compared to the actual incidence of unconstitutional 
activity by immigration officers.45  Since Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the 
Justice Department’s internal regulations have not been successful in 
preventing or deterring constitutional violations.46 
 
 41. Id. at 90 (“Over time, the original goal of identifying and arresting terrorists would become 
inextricably muddled with a broader crackdown on illegal immigrants.”). 
 42. See Chris Modlish, Immigrant Rights in Jeopardy: A Denial of Constitutional Protection in 
De La Paz v. Coy, 57 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 104, 121 (2016) (“Voluminous research exposes the fact 
that federal immigration officials regularly and systematically disregard internal procedures designed 
to protect immigrants’ constitutional rights.”).  As this author suggested, “Scholars have found that 
[border patrol officers] routinely violate immigrants’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights despite 
internal regulations and also systematically violate internal regulations when conducting worksite 
immigration raids.”  Id. at 121.  See also Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An 
Update on Locating the Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based 
Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 500–01 (1991) 
(explaining restrictions on law-enforcement actions have decreased remarkably in recent years); 
Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants 
Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 507 (2011) (explaining that ICE has made 
warrantless home raids in violation of the Fourth Amendment a “key component” of immigration 
enforcement activities, contrary to specific regulations).   
 43. Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 n.6 (1984)). 
 44. See Modlish, supra note 42, at 119. 
 45. See CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 25, at 19 (“Of the 1,255 complaints in which CBP 
reported an outcome, 95 percent of the cases resulted in ‘no action’ against the officer or agent accused 
of the misconduct.”); see also Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread 
Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting 
Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1146–47 (2008) (advocating that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lopez-Mendoza should be revisited based on the continuous and egregious violations of 
immigration officials). 
 46. See Elias, supra note 45, at 1146.  Commentators have also noted that border patrol agents’ 
improper training, misinformation, and the encouragement of more rigorous prosecution of entry 
offenses since September 11 have all been influential factors in the Justice Department’s failure to 
discourage constitutional violations perpetuated by border patrol agents and immigration officials.  See 
Stephanie Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on I.C.E., ABA J. (June 1, 2008, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/illegal_aliens_on_ice [https://perma.cc/3J33-PE6W] 
(quoting Professor Daniel Kanstroom’s testimony before the House Judiciary Committee: “I don’t 
think it’s because ICE agents particularly want to separate mothers from nursing babies, but there’s a 
culture that’s developed in that agency of feeling that their primary mission is to deport people. . . .  
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One example occurs when a foreign national is removed through the 
use of threats and misinformation, and coerced into foregoing their due 
process rights.47  Over the past decade, the practice of diverting 
deportation cases from adjudication has expanded to increase efficiency 
and minimize costs.48  Most recently, the government has promised to 
increase deportation numbers and accelerate the streamlining of all 
deportation proceedings.49  Top-ranking immigration officials have 
directed their employees to use these procedures in as many situations as 
possible, irrespective of the legal claims that the foreign nationals might 
have.50  The overwhelming majority (96%) of foreign nationals selected 
for stipulated removal do not have access to legal counsel.51  Without such 
access, the foreign national solely relies on the information provided by 
immigration officials concerning their most basic and fundamental 
 
They have enormous leeway, so it makes it hard for them to feel bound by the Fourth Amendment in 
the way we would want them to be.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Elias, supra note 
45, at 1138 (“The complexities and inconsistencies of the current system of immigration 
enforcement—where state and local actors who were previously discouraged from enforcing 
immigration laws are now encouraged to do so, individual officers who once believed that they should 
enforce immigration laws are now told that they should not, and some police officers receive 
immigration training and others do not—may help explain the increased incidence of allegations of 
violations of immigration respondents’ constitutional rights.” (internal citations omitted)); FRANCISCO 
CANTÚ, THE LINE BECOMES A RIVER: DISPATCHES FROM THE BORDER 19–20 (2018) (detailing a 
former border patrol agent’s account of a PowerPoint presentation addressed to new agents in which 
images of drug war crimes included decapitated heads in ice chests, discarded bodies in the desert, 
and twelve dead bodies stacked in a pickup truck post-executions were presented, and the instructor 
concluded with “[t]his is what you’re up against . . . this is what’s coming”). 
 47. For a discussion of several examples of unconstitutional coercion during the voluntary 
departure process, see infra notes 101–10 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study 
of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313 (1986); see also REMOVAL WITHOUT 
RECOURSE, supra note 12 (noting the dramatic increase of stipulated and expedited removals since 
2006).  For a discussion regarding the questionable effectiveness of increased summary deportations, 
see infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also AM. 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2019), https://www.american 
immigrationcouncil.org/research/primer-expedited-removal [https://perma.cc/F6F9-V4V7] (noting 
that President Trump’s January 25, 2017 executive order “direct[s] the Department of Homeland 
Security . . . to dramatically expand the use of expedited removal . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 50. See KOH ET AL., supra note 21, at 5 (quoting an email from a high-ranking immigration officer 
as follows: “Please, please, please . . . encourage the agents to work harder on the stipulated orders of 
removal . . . .  It is really important for the agents to push the stipulated orders of removal . . . .  Most 
of the [lawful permanent residents] who get out of jail are willing to take an order just to get out of jail 
sooner . . . .”). 
 51. See id. at 8.  One of the reasons why the government encouraged stipulated removals after 
1997 is because “it changed its internal rules to allow the use of stipulated removal on noncitizens 
without counsel.”  Id. at 8 n.32 (citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and 
Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312 (Mar. 
6, 1997)). 
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rights.52  Government records suggest that immigration officials are giving 
foreign nationals poorly translated, misleading, and even false information 
about their cases and that, according to one officer’s admission, “a small 
minority [of ICE agents] either don’t care whether they get it right or 
intentionally mislead the aliens as to what their rights are.”53 
In the case of stipulated removals, an immigration judge is legally 
required to confirm that the foreign national understands the rights they 
are giving up and their consent is made knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.54  Some immigration judges have expressed concern about 
the process.  At least one judge “has determined that the waiver is not 
knowing in almost all occasions” and that the foreign national who is 
unrepresented is often told, “that if he wants [to] get out of jail he should 
sign this paper.”55  Another judge expressed the major weakness is that the 
process is “handing over to ICE the duty of determining whether an alien 
has relief available,” and that ICE has “significant leverage over a pro se 
detained alien.”56  In response to these concerns, immigration officials and 
ICE have funneled stipulated removal orders away from judges who 
demand in-person hearings, and towards judges who will sign stipulated 
removal orders without question.57  Remarkably, this run-around is not 
even required for voluntary departure.  Unlike stipulated removal, 
voluntary departure does not require an immigration judge to confirm the 
waiver was obtained voluntarily and free from coercion, regardless of the 
potential claims to citizenship the foreign national may have.58  In sum, 
the lack of government resources dedicated to ensuring the fair 
adjudication of each claim comparatively to the large influx of foreign 
 
 52. See id. at 9 (“Because so many noncitizens targeted for stipulated removal do not have 
lawyers or basic information, they have no way of knowing their legal options.  As a result, their 
waiver . . . cannot be considered to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, as required by the 
government’s own internal guidelines and by due process.”). 
 53. Id. at 10 (quoting Chief Counsel Offices Responses: Stipulated Removal Process (Feb. 10, 
2006) (ICE.08-1450(13)-000222-46, 233) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54. For an explanation of the judiciary’s obligation to confirm that the foreign national’s waiver 
is made voluntarily prior to entering an order of stipulated removal, see supra notes 15–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. KOH ET AL., supra note 21, at 2 (quoting e-mail from A. Greer to EOIR Officials (June 15, 
2006) (EOIR-2008-5140(8)-000084-87)). 
 56. Id. at 12 (quoting e-mail from A. Vomacka, Immigration Judge, New York, to S. Rosen and 
S. Burr (May 7, 2008) (EOIR-2008-5140(5)-000314)). 
 57. See id. at 13–14 (“In the past decade, according to EOIR’s own data, over 100,000 of the 
almost 160,000 stipulated removal orders entered were signed by only 20 immigration judges across 
the country.  One immigration judge in Miami, Florida, has signed nearly 10,000 stipulated removal 
orders in just over three years.”). 
 58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing that voluntary departure does not 
require an immigration judge determine that the foreign national’s waiver of their statutory rights was 
done so knowingly and voluntarily). 
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nationals with pending cases has resulted in unconstitutional practices.59  
As the psychologist Abraham Maslow once famously wrote: “I suppose it 
is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if 
it were a nail.”60 
III. VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN NO ONE IS 
WATCHING 
As a result of the resource conundrum and increased illegal 
immigration activity, the abuse of voluntary departure and stipulated 
removals has risen drastically.  By coercing individuals to forego the 
formalities of removal, the government saves a plethora of resources while 
bolstering their bottom-line removal statistics at the same time.  It’s a win-
win from the government’s perspective, but even noncitizens have the 
absolute right to due process and the consequences of such violations can 
be dire.61  By taking advantage of the language barrier,62 the foreign 
national’s lack of information and their desire to avoid perpetuated 
detention,63 consent to forego formal proceedings is often not obtained 
 
 59. See ALDEN, supra note 33, at 297 (explaining that a 2002 INS study concluded that in order 
“to halt illegal immigration through enforcement alone,” the department would need: over 1000% 
more investigators, special agents, immigration inspectors and deportation officers, 300% more 
detention beds and border patrol agents, and 100% more attorneys); see also CAMPOS & CANTOR, 
supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that voluntary departure has become one of the most 
popular forms of removal due to its administrative ease since 2004). 
 60. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15–16 (1966) (“I remember seeing 
an elaborate and complicated automatic washing machine for automobiles that did a beautiful job of 
washing them.  But it could do only that, and everything else that got into its clutches was treated as 
if it were an automobile to be washed.  I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, 
to treat everything as if it were a nail.”). 
 61. For a discussion regarding the due process rights of noncitizens, see infra notes 113–17 and 
accompanying text.  In the context of expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225: 
[I]mmigration officers . . . serve as both prosecutor and judge—often investigating, 
charging, and making a decision all within the course of one day.  These rapid deportation 
decisions often fail to take into account many critical factors, including whether the 
individual is eligible to apply for lawful status in the United States, whether he or she has 
long-standing ties here, or whether he or she has U.S.-citizen family members. 
REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE, supra note 12. 
 62. See KOH ET AL., supra note 21, at 15 (“Despite the strong likelihood that many noncitizens 
targeted for stipulated removal do not speak English fluently, the federal government has failed to 
establish clear protocols to ensure that language barriers do not plague the stipulated removal 
process.”).  As one immigration official admitted: “[I]t would be really easy to trick an illiterate non-
English speaker into signing a request for a stip order.”  Id. at 14, 16 (quoting Chief Counsel Offices 
Responses: Stipulated Removal Process (Feb. 10, 2006) (ICE.08-1450(13).000222-46, 236)). 
 63. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
181, 220–22 (2017) (explaining that immigration detention “is so coercive, widespread, and racially 
skewed that it causes numerous independent harms—not only to migrants, but also to communities, 
and to the legitimacy of the immigration law system itself” (quoting César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2015))). 
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knowingly and voluntarily.  Once the foreign national finds themselves on 
the wrong side of the border they are no longer able to challenge the 
coercive and unconstitutional tactics used to obtain their consent.64  The 
following are just a few of many examples where the voluntary departure 
process has gone awry. 
Mr. Ernesto Salgado-Diaz entered the United States without 
inspection in 1989, where he lived in San Diego with his mother and 
daughter, a U.S. citizen, until 1996.65  In August 1996, Salgado-Diaz filed 
for asylum and withholding of deportation, for which INS later scheduled 
a hearing for him to show cause why he should not be deported.66  Before 
his scheduled hearing, Salgado-Diaz was walking to the grocery store 
when agents stopped him and asked him for his green card, merely because 
he appeared Hispanic.67  Salgado-Diaz informed the agents of his pending 
immigration hearing, but in response, they told him his signature was 
necessary to look up his pending immigration proceeding.68  In fact, and 
unbeknownst to Salgado-Diaz, he had signed a voluntary departure form 
and INS immediately removed Salgado-Diaz by bus to Tecate, Mexico.69 
Mr. Aladino Romero-Fereyros entered the United States pursuant to a 
B-2 visitor-visa in 1989.70  He married a U.S. citizen in 1997, and in 1998 
applied for permanent residency.71  In 2005, Customs and Immigration 
Services (CIS) scheduled an interview with Romero-Fereyros to discuss 
his applications.72  Romero-Fereyros stated that he wanted to wait for his 
attorney to arrive before commencing the interview; however, CIS officers 
 
 64. For a discussion regarding the foreign national’s inability to seek redress after being coerced 
into voluntary departure, see infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.  See also REMOVAL WITHOUT 
RECOURSE, supra note 12, at 4 (“ICE agents who ask detainees to sign stipulated removal orders often 
leave the individuals confused about their options and feeling pressured to agree to give up their right 
to hearings.  As a result, many stipulated removals cannot be said to be voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent, and the procedure raises serious due process concerns.”). 
 65. Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (alleging that “he was on his way to pick up orange juice from a local store . . . when, 
merely because he appeared to be Hispanic, the agents stopped him and asked if he had a green card”). 
 68. Id.  “Petitioner has repeatedly asserted that he did not agree to leave the country voluntarily 
and signed the departure form only because he thought it was needed to look up his pending case.  He 
distinguishes his circumstances from cases in which nonresidents have accepted voluntary departure 
as the lesser of two evils when faced with the threat of the INS instituting deportation proceedings.”  
Id. at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at 1160.  Not surprisingly, the Court held the agent’s actions amounted to a constitutional 
violation that deprived Salgado-Diaz of his due process rights and that he was coerced into his 
immediate removal.  See id. at 1163 (“[T]he unlawful arrest and removal denied him his day in court, 
substituting a peremptory deportation for a considered immigration court judgment as to whether 
Salgado-Diaz qualified to remain in the United States with his family.”). 
 70. Romero-Fereyros v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 221 F. App’x 160, 161 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 71. Id. at 161–62. 
 72. Id. at 162. 
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told him he would “lose his turn if he did not begin the interview 
immediately.”73  In other words, the officers told Romero-Fereyros he 
would need to waive his right to counsel to begin the interview.74  Romero-
Fereyros signed the waiver and admitted to several offenses committed in 
the United States.75  After the interview, authorities from ICE entered the 
room and demanded all of Romero-Fereyros’s personal belongings, 
including his glasses.76  He was then presented with voluntary departure 
forms (which he could not see) and was told to sign—thereby waiving all 
of his procedural rights and commencing expedited and immediate 
removal.77 
Ms. Diocelina Lopez-Flores was living in the United States when two 
armed men broke into her home in Texas, tied her up, gagged her, and 
threatened to kill her.78  The men did the same to her children.79  As a result 
of Lopez-Flores’s cooperation with authorities in the investigation of the 
two armed men, she was granted U-nonimmigrant status along with her 
children, which permitted her family to live and work in the United States 
for a period of five years.80  Within that period, her fourteen-year-old 
daughter ran away to Mexico, and Lopez-Flores attempted to meet her at 
the border to retrieve her and bring her home.81  Upon arrival, immigration 
officials conducted an interview and detention of Lopez-Flores and her 
daughter.82  Despite presenting the immigration officials with valid proof 
of her U-nonimmigrant status, the officials erroneously concluded that she 
was not lawfully within the United States and that her child could not 
return home.83  The immigration officials then began in systematic 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 164  (“[U]pon being taken into custody by ICE and served with the Notice of Intent, he 
was denied access to his attorney, deprived of his eyeglasses so that he could not read the Notice and 
pressured into waiving his § 238(b)(4) procedural rights by ICE authorities.  These allegations are 
serious.  They ‘are most certainly of a type that, if established, would support a finding that DHS 
violated Romero-Fereyros’s Due Process rights, and would lead us to overturn DHS’s removal 
order.’”).  In this case, the court did not find that Romero-Fereyro succeeded in his procedural due 
process challenge because he failed to show how said violations led to a “substantially different 
outcome” as he admitted to being an aggravated felon, and therefore would have “no grounds to 
challenge his eventual deportation.”  Id. at 164–65. 
 78. Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 
2018). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *2 
 83. Id.; see also infra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that the United States 
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coercion with the intent of forcing Lopez-Flores to leave the United 
States.84  She begged the officials not to remove her and explained she had 
minor children at home who would be left without a caretaker.85  The 
immigration officials ignored her, and said “that if she wanted to see an 
immigration judge, ‘then she would be jailed for three to six months, after 
which time the judge would automatically deport her.’”86  The officials 
then presented Lopez-Flores with the voluntary departure forms and told 
her that she “needed to sign,” without translating or explaining what she 
was signing.87 
Ms. Laura S. was a citizen of Mexico and had three children in the 
United States with a man named Sergio H.88  Sergio was physically 
abusive to Laura, and as a result, Laura obtained a protective order against 
Sergio.89  Sergio was ordered back to Mexico, where he allegedly began 
working for a drug cartel.90  Sergio told Laura that if he ever saw her again 
he would kill her.91  A little over a year later, Laura was pulled over for a 
minor traffic violation and could not produce the necessary paperwork to 
prove her legal status.92  The law enforcement officer sent her to a Customs 
and Border Patrol (CBP) agent, to whom she explained that “her 
dangerous ex-boyfriend resided in Mexico, and that she feared for her life 
if she returned.”93  She pled with immigration officials and “wept and 
begged not to be returned to Mexico.”94  The immigration officials did not 
inform Laura of her right to a hearing before an immigration judge or of 
her right to seek asylum.95  Rather, they “rushed through the proceedings” 
and “forcefully demanded that she sign” the voluntary departure 
 
Citizenship and Immigration Servises (USCIS) eventually determined that the immigration officer’s 
initial decision to deport Lopez-Flores on the basis that she had violated her U-nonimmigrant was 
erroneous). 
 84. Lopez-Flores, 2018 WL 6579180, at *2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  This is clearly not how deportation proceedings work.  As described above, Lopez-Flores 
would have had the right to an attorney, to present evidence of her lawful status (the same evidence 
that the immigration officials here willfully ignored), and the right to a full hearing.  See supra notes 
8–11 and accompanying text. 
 87. Lopez-Flores, 2018 WL 6579180, at *2–3.  After her removal to Mexico, Lopez-Flores 
eventually succeeded in returning to the United States and applied for permanent status.  USCIS 
“denied her application on the basis of her ‘voluntary’ return to Mexico.  However, USCIS noted that 
CBP incorrectly determined that [Lopez-Flores] had violated [her] nonimmigrant status and [was] 
removable from the United States . . . .”  Id. at *3 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Maria S. v. Garza, No. 1:13-cv-108, 2015 WL 4394745, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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paperwork.96  In the early morning hours of the next day, the CBP agent 
drove her to the international bridge and forced her return to Mexico.97  
Five days later, her ex-boyfriend, Sergio, abducted and killed her.98 
In some cases, officers’ coercive tactics during voluntary departure 
have been consistent enough to necessitate the issuance of an injunction.  
In Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, a class of Salvadoran citizens residing in 
the United States, who had been taken into custody by INS, brought a civil 
action challenging the policies of INS and the coercive tactics used by the 
agents to effectuate a voluntary departure.99  The court found that “[t]he 
widespread acceptance of voluntary departure is due in large part to the 
coercive effects of the practices and procedures employed by INS and the 
unfamiliarity of most Salvadorans with their rights under United States 
immigration laws.”100  According to the court, “Many class members were 
intimidated or coerced to accept voluntary departure even when they had 
unequivocally expressed a fear of returning to El Salvador.”101  As a result, 
the court permanently enjoined federal immigration officers from coercing 
Salvadoran immigrants to forego their rights under formal removal 
processes in lieu of voluntary departure.102 
In the cases outlined above, the foreign nationals were fortunate 
enough to return to the United States long enough for their case to be heard 
with the tragic exception of Laura S., who lost her life following her 
involuntary removal.  Many victims of coerced consent, however, are not 
as fortunate.  In the last several decades, Mexican nationals have routinely 
crossed the southern border to escape the systematic violence and 
corruption from the pervasive influence of Mexican cartels.103  Between 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *2. 
 98. Id. (“Once she returned to Mexico, Laura S. stayed at her grandmother’s house.  Laura S.’s 
friends and relatives began emergency efforts to get her out of Mexico.  After learning of Laura S.’s 
return to Mexico, Sergio H. soon accosted her, blocking her car and beating her brutally.  Laura S. 
was rescued by a relative.  Several days later, on June 14, 2009, Sergio H. abducted Laura S. and killed 
her.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 99. 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 
919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1511–14. 
 103. See Juan A. Solis, Land of Cartels: The Downfall of Mexico’s Post-Revolutionary 
Authoritarian Regime (2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with author).  
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), formed in 1929, was Mexico’s sole political party until 
the 1980s.  Id. at 12.  Through their reign of political dominance, “Mexican criminal organizations 
had a long-standing, unofficial agreement with the PRI regime,” permitting them to traffic narcotics 
for the benefit of the Mexican economy with minimal use of violence necessary.  Id. at 17–18.  After 
political unrest in the late 1980s that disturbed PRI’s exclusive political control, the enforcement of 
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August 2016 and April 2017, the Binational Defense and Advocacy 
Program surveyed over 600 Mexican national migrants aged eighteen and 
above within ten days of their deportation.104  The following are 
testimonials from the survey: A twenty-year-old male deportee explained 
that he “felt pressured to sign documents before leaving the United States.  
The agents did not explain the contents of the documents I signed and did 
not allow me to read them.  Nor did they inform me that I had a right to 
communicate with the Mexican Consulate.”105  A fifty-one-year-old 
female deportee said that she repeatedly told the agent “that I did not want 
to sign, that I wanted to fight my case, [and] that I wanted a list of lawyers, 
but he said that I had to sign—there was no other way.”106  A forty-year-
old female deportee explained, “They just about put a gun to my head.  
They said I had gotten five years [penalty] and if I didn’t sign I’d get 
another five.”107  Even some foreign nationals that had lawyers were not 
given the chance to speak with them before signing the removal 
documents.108  A twenty-one-year-old male deportee explained that he 
“had to sign three forms that were folded in half so that he could not see 
the contents, even though he asked that they be explained to him.”109  Of 
the nearly 600 interviewees, 50.7% said they were not allowed to read the 
documents before signing them and 58.1% said that the forms were only 
provided in English.110  As a result, children have been separated from 
their parents in some cases.111  Yet these individuals have no recourse if 
 
state power became decentralized causing the agreement between the state and the Mexican cartels to 
deteriorate.  See id. at 18.  Thereafter, increased violence persisted from multiple political parties and 
cartel factions struggling to gain control.  Id. at 50 (“[D]rug trafficking organizations could not always 
depend on the state to turn a blind eye anymore, and this reality reinforced the need to use violence as 
an alternative.”).  As a result, “[l]ife in Mexico has been drastically shaped by the violence and 
corruption surrounding drug trafficking organizations, and tens of thousands of innocent lives have 
been lost as a result of the state’s inability, at times unwillingness, to eradicate organized crime.”  Id. 
at 54. 
 104. CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 25, at 20. 
 105. Id. at 4. 
 106. Id. at 8. 
 107. Id. at 10. 
 108. Id. at 11 (quoting a survey participant who stated: “I got scared because I had already asked 
if I could place a call to my lawyer and [the border agent] said no”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 9. 
 111. Nicole Abruzzo, Voluntary Departure Post-IIRIRA: A Struggle Between Equitable Considerations 
Promoting Clemency Measures, and Statutory Considerations Tending Towards Oppression, 21 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 881, 886–87 (2007) (“[R]eports indicate that tens of thousands of children were left 
behind in 2003 by the 887,000 aliens compelled to voluntarily depart that year.”).  The current 
administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy has only exacerbated the issue.  An assistant federal public defender 
estimated that during a two-and-a-half-week period from May–June 2018 in McAllen, Texas, just one 
division of Texas’s Southern District, more than 400 children were separated from parents whose criminal 
cases were heard.  Alicia A. Caldwell, Mass Hearings, Uncertain Futures for Migrants Separated From 
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they are unable to return to the United States and afford a lawyer.  In other 
words, and as many commentators have noted, “[w]hat we’re seeing in 
court is really just the tip of the iceberg.”112 
IV. A DEAD END: THE LACK OF LEGAL REDRESS AVAILABLE FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DEPARTURES 
Ms. Lopez-Flores and countless other foreign nationals are often 
presented with a difficult Hobson’s choice: they are told that they may 
forego their constitutional right to a formal hearing in lieu of a speedy 
departure or remain incarcerated for an indefinite amount of time—
awaiting an inevitable outcome of deportation.  Even foreign nationals that 
have a legal right to remain are being coerced to leave the country through 
misinformation.  The former scenario almost always strips the immigrant 
of the right to challenge the tactics used to obtain their consent to the 
“voluntary” departure and not many immigrants are willing to risk months 
of incarceration if an immigration officer incorrectly assures them 
deportation is inevitable.  First, this section will explore the constitutional 
protections afforded to foreign nationals in the U.S. legally and illegally, 
and second, whether there exists some avenue of legal redress if a foreign 
national’s procedural due process rights during removal are violated. 
A long line of Supreme Court precedent holds that foreign nationals, 
even those in this country unlawfully, are entitled to due process 
protection.113  “Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, 
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.”114  
The “fundamentals of due process” are offended if the alien has his or her 
liberty stripped without “notice, hearing, and an appeal” before 
deportation.115  Of course, a foreign national may waive his or her 
constitutional protections by signing a voluntary departure consent form—
 
Their Children, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mass-hearings-
uncertain-futures-for-migrants-separated-from-their-children-1528662134 [https://perma.cc/J95N-L93N].  
As a result, many foreign nationals whom initially plead not guilty will change their plea to guilty for the sole 
reason to be reunited with their children sooner.  Id. 
 112. Ward, supra note 46 (“Immigration lawyers say the searches have become both—widespread 
and egregious—and that it is time for the court to revisit Lopez-Mendoza.”).   
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.  
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, 
even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to . . . due process of law.”). 
 114. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77. 
 115. Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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as long as their waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.116  Thus, an 
immigration official’s failure to adequately explain the effects and 
consequences of signing a voluntary departure form amounts to a due 
process violation.117 
In 1871, Congress passed a statute that was later codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which entitles injured persons to sue for money damages against 
a state official if the state official violates their constitutional rights.118  
Congress did not create an analogous statute permitting an action for 
money damages to be brought against individual federal officers.  It was 
not until 1971 that the Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, where the Court held 
that it would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by 
federal officers who violated the prohibition against unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.119  In the decade that followed, 
the Court extended the scope of the Bivens remedy to include a Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claim under the Due Process Clause in Davis 
v. Passman,120 and an Eighth Amendment claim brought by a federal 
prisoner in Carlson v. Green.121  Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, however, 
represent the only cases where the Supreme Court recognized a damage 
remedy against federal officials absent statutory authority.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has not created a new Bivens remedy since 1980 and a 
Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim has never been 
recognized. 
The Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) vests federal courts with 
jurisdiction over certain civil actions against the United States for damages 
caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees in 
circumstances where a private person would be liable to the plaintiff under 
state law where the act occurred.122  In other words, the liability under the 
 
 116. Nose v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 993 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Maria S. v. Garza, No. 
1:13-cv-108, 2015 WL 4394745, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015) (explaining that “constitutional 
standards are satisfied only if [the voluntary departure] waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily”). 
 117. See, e.g., Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 669–70 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (enjoining 
immigration officials for failing to explain the consequences of voluntary departure to minor children). 
 118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 119. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied damage remedy is available to compensate persons 
injured by federal officers who violated the individual’s constitutional rights). 
 120. 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (holding that a damages remedy was appropriate under Bivens 
against a Congressman for gender discrimination). 
 121. 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (holding petitioner’s estate could recover under the Eighth 
Amendment via a Bivens action for the wrongful death of petitioner caused by the officer’s inhumane 
treatment and failure to provide medical care). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012 & Supp. 2019) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the 
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances . . . .”). 
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FTCA arises only when state law would impose it under like 
circumstances in a nonfederal context.123  The Court has observed that the 
statutory phrase “like circumstances” does not mean under the “same 
circumstances” when determining whether a private analog exists under 
state law.124  The seminal Supreme Court case on this issue is Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, where the Court held that the plaintiff’s 
claims against the government for their negligent operation of a lighthouse 
were not barred solely because there were no private lighthouses in 
operation at the time.125  FTCA liability does not extend, however, to 
“uniquely governmental” functions that “could not conceivably be[] 
privately performed.”126 
Unlike the privatization of lighthouses, a once solely regulated 
governmental function, deporting an individual on the basis that he or she 
lacks citizenship, “could not conceivably be[] privately performed.”127  As 
the Second Circuit has recognized, “no private citizen is empowered to 
certify the loss of American nationality.”128  In other words, a private 
individual could not be held liable under state law for abusing a process 
that he or she could not conceivably invoke.129  Thus, the FTCA likely fails 
to provide relief to an immigrant who was coerced to leave the country 
under voluntary departure unless he or she also has a Fourth Amendment 
claim for false imprisonment.130 
  
 
 123. Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 
F.3d 716, 728 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 124. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955). 
 125. See id. at 66–67. 
 126. Id. at 68; see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141–42 (1950) (holding servicemen 
injured in the armed forces due to negligence of their superiors do not have a claim under the FTCA 
because “no private individual has power to conscript or mobilize a private army with such authorities 
over persons as the Government vests in echelons of command”). 
 127. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 68. 
 128. Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 129. See Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 
2018) (explaining FTCA liability does not extend to an abuse of process claim where petitioner was 
denied due process through removal proceedings). 
 130. See Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that in the 
immigration context, the proper state law analogy for an unlawful detention is “a person who, entirely 
in his or her private capacity, places someone under arrest for an alleged violation of the law—a so 
called ‘citizen’s arrest’”); see also Camacho v. Cannella, No. EP-12-CV-40-KC, 2012 WL 3719749 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2012) (holding FTCA liability exists for false arrest made by FBI agents).  
Although a few courts have found the proper analogy for an immigration detention to be a detention 
by state law-enforcement officers, the Supreme Court specifically instructed in Olson that “a court 
[must] look to the state-law liability of private entities, not to that of public entities, when assessing 
the Government’s liability under the FTCA . . . .”  United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 46 (2005) 
(emphasis added). 
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V. CURBING CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY IMMIGRATION 
OFFICIALS AND THE EXTENSION OF A BIVENS ACTION 
The creation of a Bivens action for unconstitutional coercion during 
the voluntary departure process would not only be a device for making the 
foreign national whole, but it would also curb the abuse of immigration 
officers’ current unfettered discretion.  In sum, a Bivens action would hold 
a federal officer accountable if they willfully disregard a foreign national’s 
constitutional and statutory rights under the INA. 
A. Navigating the INA’s Jurisdictional Hurdles 
Before a Bivens claim may be asserted in federal court, the court itself 
must have proper subject-matter jurisdiction.  The INA governs all aspects 
of immigration law, and in many instances, strips federal courts of 
jurisdiction in cases where the immigration officer made a discretionary 
decision or where the appropriate method of review is through an 
administrative proceeding instead of a federal district court.131  The first 
jurisdictional hurdle is section 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides: 
[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review–– 
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 
 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or 
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary 
 of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this 
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 
1158(a) of this title.132 
Section 1229c, listed in subsection (i) above, pertains to the decision 
to permit voluntary departure in lieu of formal removal proceedings, at the 
discretion of the Attorney General.133  The Fifth Circuit held that the term 
“judgment” in subsection (i) applies only to discretionary determinations 
 
 131. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of the 
power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”); 
see also Rubenstein, supra note 30, at 9 (“In the immigration context, Congress has vested jurisdiction 
in the federal circuit courts to review final orders of removal issued by the BIA . . . .”). 
 132. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 133. See id. § 1229c(a)(1) (2012) (“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart 
the United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to [removal 
proceedings before an immigration judge] . . . .”). 
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made by the Attorney General.134  Therefore, both subsections have the 
effect of barring discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General 
from judicial review.135  In the context of voluntary departure, it is the 
decision by the Attorney General or their agents to offer voluntary 
departure in lieu of formal proceedings that is insulated from judicial 
review.  In other words, the discretion of the Attorney General is only 
relevant if the foreign national “is properly subject to removal 
proceedings” in the first place.136  In cases where the individual’s waiver 
of their statutory rights is being challenged, the Attorney General’s 
decision to afford the individual the option of voluntary departure is not in 
dispute.  Likewise, the government does not have the discretion to use 
coercive tactics in obtaining the individual’s waiver—as such conduct 
would violate the Constitution and the INA.137  Section 1252(a)(2)(B) 
therefore does not bar judicial review of such conduct.138 
Section 1252(g) of the INA presents another jurisdictional hurdle.  The 
 
 134. Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e hold [§ 
1252(a)(2)(B)’s] ban on review of judgment[s] regarding the granting of relief precludes review only 
of discretionary decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“[A]ny other decision or action of the Attorney 
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this 
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .”). 
 136. Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 
2018) (explaining that only “if an alien is properly subject to removal proceedings, the Attorney 
General has the discretion to forego such formal proceedings in lieu of an informal and expedited 
voluntary removal procedure . . . as long as said waiver is accomplished knowingly and voluntarily” 
(citing Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzalez, 395 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
 137. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“Thus, the discretionary function 
exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course 
of action for an employee to follow.”); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary if it violates the Constitution, a statute, or an applicable 
regulation.  Federal officials do not possess discretion to violate constitutional rights or federal 
statutes.”). 
 138. In some cases, immigration officials may detain a foreign national while employing coercive 
tactics and claim that such detention was a discretionary decision allotted by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  Such 
argument will likely also fail, because the Attorney General does not have the discretion to violate the 
Constitution or federal statutes, including the INA.  Section 1357 of the INA requires the following in 
order for an immigration officer to justify a detention: 
[T]o arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so 
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely 
to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall 
be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service 
having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United 
States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2012).  In many cases, the immigration official will have a difficult time 
showing that the foreign national was “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained” especially 
if the foreign national is claiming residency in the United States.  See Lopez-Flores, No. 1:17-cv-
00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2018) (holding officers had insufficient cause to 
detain plaintiff where plaintiff legally resided within the United States and begged the officers to allow 
her to return home to take care of her minor children). 
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relevant portion of the statute states, “no court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the 
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this 
chapter.”139  The Supreme Court has held that section 1252(g)’s 
jurisdictional bar “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney 
General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”140  The jurisdictional bar 
has therefore not prevented courts from reviewing constitutional claims 
that generally arise in the deportation context.141  In Humphries v. Various 
Federal USINS Employees, the plaintiff brought suit claiming officers 
violated his constitutional rights while he was in custody awaiting the 
execution of his removal order.142  The Fifth Circuit held that the tenuous 
connection between the plaintiff’s claims to the decision to execute a 
removal order was not sufficient to bring the plaintiff’s cause of action 
within section 1252’s jurisdictional bar.143  Many other circuits have 
similarly followed suit.144  The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that the 
decision not to commence formal removal proceedings is one that does bar 
federal review under section 1252(g).145  As explained earlier, however, it 
is not the immigration officer’s discretionary decision to offer voluntary 
departure that is being challenged—rather, it is the process by which the 
immigration officers obtain the foreign national’s consent.146  As the 
Southern District of Texas explained: 
The Court is not asked to review whether Defendants’ discretionary 
decision was appropriate, but whether the procedures used to gain 
[plaintiff’s] consent complied with constitutional standards.  Though 
factually related, the procedures used to gain [plaintiff’s] consent are 
merely ancillary to the Defendants’ discrete decision to offer her a 
voluntary departure, and are not encompassed within § 1252(g)’s 
 
 139. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012). 
 140. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012)). 
 141. See Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 944–45 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 142. See id. at 939. 
 143. Id. at 946. 
 144. See, e.g., Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding § 1252(g) 
did not preclude the court “from ruling on constitutional challenges to deportation procedures”); 
Mustata v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021–22 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding plaintiff’s due 
process challenge to deportation procedures was not barred by § 1252(g)); Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 
F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 145. See Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, 180 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 146. See Maria S. v. Garza, No. 1:13-CV-108, 2015 WL 4394745, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015) 
(holding plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to officer’s coercive consent tactics does not fall into the 
purview of § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar).  
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jurisdictional bar.147 
Therefore, the INA does not jurisdictionally bar courts from hearing a 
plaintiff’s Bivens claim in the context of coerced consent violations. 
B. The Case for a Bivens Exception 
As noted, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the scope 
of Bivens and create a judicial remedy in the face of Congressional 
silence.148  A decision to create a cause of action is best left to legislators 
in many cases, which is why the creation of a Bivens remedy implicates 
separation of powers concerns.149  When determining whether to recognize 
a cause of action under Bivens, a court must first determine whether a 
plaintiff’s claim presents a “new context” that differentiates the plaintiff’s 
claim in a meaningful way from a previous Bivens decision.150  If the claim 
presents a “new context,” a court may not extend a Bivens remedy if (1) 
“any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest” exists or (2) 
there are “special factors counselling hesitation” for creating the judicial 
remedy.151  The Supreme Court has most recently directed that “[w]hen 
deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the 
‘determinative’ question is one of statutory intent.”152 
1.  The Abuse of the Voluntary Departure Process: A New Context 
Generally, courts do not extend Bivens remedies on an amendment-
 
 147. Id.; see also Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, et al., No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *8–9 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) (“[H]ad Plaintiff’s consent for voluntary departure not been fraudulently 
obtained, the Attorney General would then  have had the discretion to commence removal proceedings 
or, as in Alvidres-Reyes, not to commence such proceedings—it is this decision that would have been 
barred from judicial review.  However, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ decision to offer her 
the option to waive her rights to a formal removal proceeding, instead Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ 
conduct in coercing her to forego her procedural rights under the INA.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 148. As the Fifth Circuit recognized, the Supreme Court “has not created a new Bivens remedy in 
the last thirty-five years, although ‘it has reversed more than a dozen appellate decisions that had 
created new actions for damages.’” De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).  For a discussion of the only cases 
where the Supreme Court has extended a Bivens remedy, see supra notes 120–22 and accompanying 
text.   
 149. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1855 (2017) (“[W]here Congress ‘intends private litigants to have a cause of action,’ the ‘far 
better course’ is for Congress to confer that remedy in explicit terms.” (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979))). 
 150. See De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 372. 
 151. Id. at 375 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). 
 152. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)). 
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by-amendment basis.  Rather, a context-specific approach is employed.153  
A court must determine whether a plaintiff’s Bivens claim differs in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by the Supreme 
Court, and if it does, then it is a new context.154  The Supreme Court has 
advised that the following factors should be considered when determining 
whether a new context is present: 
A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of officers 
involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of 
the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer 
should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the 
statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; 
the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of 
other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous 
Bivens cases did not consider.155 
In many challenges to the voluntary departure process, the plaintiff 
also asserts a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful detention.  Although 
Bivens was originally decided on a Fourth Amendment unlawful search 
and seizure issue, courts have been reluctant to recognize immigration-
related Fourth Amendment claims unless they also allege unlawful 
excessive force.156  However, many constitutional violations that occur 
during voluntary departure do not involve the use of force, such as coerced 
consent offenses.157  For these foreign nationals, their Fourth Amendment 
claims present a new context that differs in a meaningful way from the 
cases that have previously extended a Bivens remedy.  Likewise, a Fifth 
Amendment procedural due process claim would also be a “new context” 
requiring a full Bivens analysis, as the Supreme Court has only recognized 
a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.158 
 
 153. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68–69 (2001). 
 154. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 155. Id. at 1860.   
 156. Compare Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (permitting a 
Bivens cause of action for a detained alien who was physically abused at the U.S.-Mexico border), and 
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369–70 (5th Cir. 1987) (assuming the existence of a Bivens 
remedy for physical abuse perpetrated against immigration detainees), with De La Paz v. Coy, 786 
F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that an immigration detention that does not include an excessive 
force allegation is a “new context” under Bivens). 
 157. For a discussion of cases where the plaintiff alleges due process violations but not an 
excessive force claim, see supra notes 65–98 and accompanying text. 
 158. Compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (extending Bivens to an equal 
protection claim brought by an employee against a Congressman for gender discrimination), with 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414, 429 (1988) (declining to extend Bivens against Social 
Security officials for the deprivation of allegedly entitled benefits under the statute), and FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (declining to extend Bivens for a wrongful termination claim against 
a federal agency). 
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2. Enforcing Congressional Intent Through Bivens 
Since creating a Bivens remedy for constitutional violations during the 
voluntary departure process presents a new context, a new Bivens remedy 
may not be recognized if “any alternative, existing process for protecting 
the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to 
refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.”159  In 
other words, so long as a plaintiff has an avenue for some redress, a court 
does not need to step in and create, or supplement, the existing remedial 
scheme created by Congress.160  In the context of immigration law, several 
circuit courts have considered the INA to be a comprehensive remedial 
scheme and suggested that courts should “stay its Bivens hand” when 
considering to supplement the statute with a judicially-created remedy.161  
These opinions relied extensively on the comprehensiveness of the INA 
scheme and the remedies therein to redress the plaintiff’s grievances.162  
Generally, the INA is a sufficient remedial scheme because agency norms 
are “closely tailored to conform with constitutional standards.”163  
However, courts have previously intruded on its domain to ensure 
deportation proceedings conform to constitutional standards, especially 
where INA’s remedial scheme itself is not made available to the plaintiff 
due to the nature of constitutional violations alleged.164  The Second 
Circuit concluded that when the government took actions that impaired the 
plaintiff’s ability to seek judicial review normally afforded under the INA, 
 
 159. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
 160. See Maria S. v. Garza, No. 1:13-CV-108, 2015 WL 4394745, at *8 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015). 
 161. De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 377 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Since the INA was enacted in 1952, Congress has 
frequently amended it,” suggesting “Congress’s failure to provide an individual damages remedy ‘has not 
been inadvertent.’” (quoting Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423); see also Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 
982–83 (9th Cir. 2011) (focusing on the INA’s “complexity and comprehensiveness” and declining to extend 
Bivens because of the “extensive remedial procedures available to and invoked” by the plaintiffs through the 
INA).  
 162. Garza, 2015 WL 4394745, at *9 (explaining that in both De La Paz and Mirmehdi, the INA was 
available for plaintiffs to seek redress).  In De La Paz, the plaintiffs alleged they were stopped and searched 
in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.  786 F.3d at 370–71.  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that once 
detained, the plaintiffs had the remedial scheme of the INA at their disposal, which included, inter alia, the 
right to challenge removal at a formal removal proceeding and the right to appeal.  See id. at 375–76.  
Likewise, in Mirmehdi, the plaintiff alleged a wrongful detention claim and the Ninth Circuit refused to 
extend Bivens because the plaintiff had the ability to challenge the officer’s conduct through the INA’s 
remedial scheme.  See Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982–83 (focusing on the alternative remedies made available 
to plaintiff through the INA).  In the realm of coerced consent cases, however, the plaintiff does not have 
access to the INA’s protections once the constitutional violation occurs, as they are often removed from the 
country immediately thereafter.  See infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
 163. De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 378. 
 164. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1513–14 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub 
nom.  Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (enjoining federal immigration agents 
from using coercive tactics in immigration proceedings); Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 669–70 
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (same). 
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“any reliance on the INA as an alternative remedial scheme presents 
difficulties.”165  Therefore, the INA is a comprehensive and sufficient 
remedial scheme to the extent a plaintiff has access to it.166 
In addition, courts are also required to “make the kind of remedial 
determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying 
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation 
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”167  Courts have 
recognized that the special factors analysis is a remarkably low bar and 
that “[h]estitation is a pause, not a full stop, or an abstention.”168  The 
inquiry must concentrate on “whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent 
congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and 
benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”169  In other words, the 
analysis comes down to “who should decide whether such a remedy should 
be provided.”170  In the context of immigration cases, courts have found 
the following factors counsel hesitation for extending a Bivens remedy: 
fear that the immigration officer may “readily shirk his duty”;171 the 
imposition of significant costs due to a “tidal wave of litigation”;172 the 
 
 165. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 573 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 166. Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 
2018) (explaining “the INA is a comprehensive remedial scheme sufficient for protecting a plaintiff’s 
rights to the extent a plaintiff is able to access the remedies within said scheme”).  The conclusion is 
consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, which reiterates that the three cases decided by the 
Court that justified a Bivens remedy were cases where the plaintiff had no other avenue for redress.  
See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007) (“Davis had no other remedy, Bivens himself was 
not thought to have an effective one, and in Carlson the plaintiff had none against Government 
officials.”).  If a plaintiff is unable to access the remedial scheme enacted by Congress, they logically 
fall into the same category as Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, which all justified the creation of a judicial 
remedy as they were “damages or nothing” cases.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971).  Subsequent to a coerced consent departure, the foreign 
national no longer has access to the INA’s remedial scheme or the U.S. courts to seek redress, and 
therefore coerced consent cases present a distinctly different scenario than most Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment immigration-related Bivens claims. 
 167. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 168. Arar, 585 F.3d at 574; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (explaining that 
extending a Bivens remedy is now a “disfavored” judicial activity). 
 169. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (“[T]he decision to recognize a damages 
remedy requires an assessment of its impact on governmental operations systemwide.  Those matters 
include the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs 
and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the 
legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies.”). 
 170. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 
1855–56 (explaining that the “determinative question is one of statutory intent” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 171. De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 379 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 172. Id. at 379–80 (“There are over 11 million illegal aliens in the United States” and it is an “easy 
exercise for aliens, even without an attorney, to file suit alleging, as in these cases, that there was no 
reasonable suspicion for their stops, arrests, or detentions”). 
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suppression of legitimate evidence obtained during mass arrests;173 the 
possible disclosure of sensitive “foreign-policy objectives”;174 and finally, 
often “the aliens’ ultimate remedies lie in pursuing termination of removal 
proceedings through the INA’s many available avenues.”175 
In most immigration cases, these concerns counsel some degree of 
hesitation when determining whether to recognize a judicially created 
remedy.  In a coerced consent case, however, these concerns begin to lose 
force and counsel in favor of acknowledging a judicially-created 
remedy—not against it.  A foreign national facing the choice of voluntary 
departure indeed does not want the immigration officer to “shirk his 
duties,” but rather, comply with them.  The creation of a Bivens remedy 
for officers who coerce individuals into voluntary departure conversely 
encourages officers to inform individuals of their rights to formal 
proceedings, consistent with their statutory obligations under the INA.  At 
the very least, the officer would be sure that the individual could read and 
understand the documents they were signing, and understood the 
constitutional and statutory rights they were forgoing.176  It would be quite 
an anomaly in the execution of any other contract if the contract drafter 
refused to provide a translated copy of the agreement to the recipient in a 
language they could understand, the recipient was coerced to sign it, and 
the contract drafter then claimed that misrepresentation and duress were 
not valid defenses.177 
 
 173. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1984). 
 174. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted) (declining to extend Bivens in the immigration context given “the unique foreign 
policy considerations implicated in the immigration context”).  
 175. De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 379. 
 176. See Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 669–70 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (enjoining immigration 
officials from failing to explain the consequences of voluntary departure to minor children).  In a 
factually distinct but analogous scenario, an immigrant who challenges a deportation order under 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(d) must show “(1) exhaustion of any available administrative remedies; (2) improper 
deprivation of judicial review in the underlying removal proceedings; and (3) prejudice.”  United 
States v. Lopez-Menera, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing United States v. Ortiz-
Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2004)).  In Lopez-Menera the immigration judge failed to 
inform the defendant of his eligibility for voluntary departure, and such failure to inform violated 
defendant’s due process rights.  See id. at 1030.  Similarly, the failure of border patrol agents to inform 
an individual of their procedural due process rights under the INA, or worse, misinform them, also 
abridges the constitutional rights of the immigrant.  See Maria S. v. Garza, No. 1:13-CV-108, 2015 
WL 4394745, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2015) (discussing voluntary departure waiver must be 
accomplished knowingly and voluntarily to comply with due process). 
 177. In the context of contract law, misrepresentation and duress are sufficient defenses to void an 
agreement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(explaining that fraudulent misrepresentation occurs when the misrepresentation is “consciously false 
but must also be intended to mislead another”).  See also Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 546 
(2d Cir. 1989) (citing Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp, 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971) (explaining a 
defense of duress must be based on proof that the party was subjected to a “wrongful threat precluding 
 
342 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
Likewise, the concerns of “crowded circumstances” and sensitivity to 
the disclosure of specific “foreign policy” have no place in the context of 
a coerced removal.  If anything, the circumstances are far from confused 
and crowded as the standard voluntary departure consent forms are read 
and signed in the controlled environment of an interrogation room.178  Nor 
is it clear how there is any risk that sensitive foreign policy could be 
disclosed in the event the foreign national was encouraged to pursue their 
constitutional and statutory rights or if they were able to bring an action in 
federal court to vindicate those rights.179  To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has recently written to emphasize the “strong national interest 
Congress has in protecting aliens from mistreatment.”180  As the Fifth 
Circuit recognized, “[t]here are . . . no  identifiable national interests that 
justify the wanton infliction of pain,”181 just as there appears to be no 
national interest in justifying the fraudulent obtainment of an individual’s 
consent to removal. 
From a cost perspective, the decision to recognize a damage remedy 
requires a court to weigh the benefits and financial burdens of imposing 
liability on individual officers—a decision often best left to Congress.182  
The Fifth Circuit has expressed fear that extending Bivens into the 
immigration context would create a “tidal wave” of litigation, relying on 
the fact that there are eleven million undocumented immigrants in the 
 
the exercise of free will”)).  In United States v. Ramos, the court concluded that a waiver of the right 
to appeal is not intelligent if it is not received in the defendant’s language when he signs the form.  
623 F.3d 672, 677–80 (9th Cir. 2010).  For a discussion of how removal forms are often improperly 
translated, see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 66–98 and accompanying text (describing factual scenarios of cases where 
the immigration officer’s detention and acts of coercion were accomplished in a controlled 
environment).  
 179. Cf. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As the Supreme Court 
has noted, concerns that always mitigate against ‘subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and 
decisionmaking to outside inquiry’ have particular force in the immigration context.  Rather than mere 
‘disclosure of normal domestic law-enforcement priorities and techniques’ such cases often involve 
‘the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products.’” 
(quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999))).  In the 
case of coercion in the voluntary departure context, however, the “prosecutor’s motives and 
decisionmaking” never come into play because the individual is coerced to leave the country prior to 
the initiation of formal proceedings against her.  Id. at 983.  See Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, et al., No. 
1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining the Attorney General’s 
discretionary decision to offer voluntary departure is only applicable if formal removal proceedings 
are first legitimately commenced). 
 180. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 276 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012)), vacated in part and reinstated in part on reh’g en banc, 785 F.3d 
117 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 181. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 182. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017) (“It is not necessarily a judicial function 
to establish whole categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against personal liability 
claims in the complex sphere of litigation . . . .”). 
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United States and Border Patrol agents accounted for 420,789 
apprehensions in 2013 alone.183  The Fifth Circuit feared that it would be 
an “easy exercise for aliens, even without an attorney, to file suit 
alleging . . . that there was no reasonable suspicion for their stops, arrests, 
or detentions.”184  This assumes, however, that the individual remains in 
the United States long enough to bring frivolous claims.  In the context of 
coerced removal, the foreign national is often immediately deported after 
her consent is obtained.  A “tidal wave” of litigation would not follow in 
coerced consent cases simply because most foreign nationals removed 
from the United States are unable to return.185 
Finally, in many Bivens cases involving immigration arrests, courts 
have held that the immigration context counsels hesitation because the 
plaintiff’s “ultimate remedies lie in pursuing termination of removal 
proceedings through the INA’s many available avenues.”186  Thus, 
creating a damage remedy in light of congressional silence counsels 
hesitation simply due to the existence of the INA’s comprehensive 
remedial structure.  While that may be true for standard immigration 
arrests and detentions, it also assumes the individual will have the ability 
to access the INA’s protections, including the ability to seek termination 
of removal proceedings, a hearing in front of an immigration judge, and 
the right to counsel.  It is quite different, however, when as a result of the 
constitutional violation, the individual is denied access to the INA’s 
protections altogether.187  The challenge the plaintiff is bringing in coerced 
consent cases is drastically different—it is the challenge to the legitimacy 
of their consent which, as a result, waives all of their substantive and 
procedural rights under the INA and the Constitution.  Without the ability 
to challenge the legitimacy of such consent there may be no limit to what 
immigration officers may do, or say, to coerce a foreign national to leave 
the country through the “voluntary” departure process.  As the Supreme 
Court most recently reiterated in Ziglar, the “‘determinative’ question” in 
determining the validity of a Bivens remedy “is one of statutory intent.”188  
The INA is a comprehensive remedial scheme with a plethora of 
 
 183. De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 184. Id. at 380. 
 185. For a discussion regarding the testimonials of many foreign nationals who were deported but 
have no recourse to have their coerced consent violations heard because of their inability to return to 
the United States, see supra notes 103–12 and accompanying text. 
 186. De La Paz, 786 F.3d at 379. 
 187. See id. at 378. 
 188. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275, 286 (2001)). 
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protections for individuals who have access to it.189  However, where an 
individual is deprived access to the scheme itself, it becomes the 
responsibility of the judiciary to not only enforce the Constitution but to 
enforce the statutory provisions promulgated by Congress.190  By creating 
a Bivens remedy in coerced consent cases, a court effectively accomplishes 
both. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The creation of a Bivens remedy alone will not eradicate due process 
violations during removal and deportation.191  Currently, few foreign 
nationals will be given the opportunity to present their case in a federal 
court, but more importantly, a Bivens remedy does not address the 
underlying causes that perpetuate the problem: the foreign national’s lack 
of access to legal information and the immigration officers’ incentive to 
remove individuals efficiently as possible in the interest of national 
 
 189. For a discussion of the protections afforded to foreign nationals under the INA, see supra 
notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 190. Lopez-Flores v. Ibarra, No. 1:17-cv-00105, 2018 WL 6579180, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 
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in part, vacated in part, remanded, 899 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2018))). 
 191. Although valiant efforts have recently been made by advocacy groups, the fight is far from 
over.  In 2014, the ACLU obtained a favorable settlement addressing the problem of coerced consent 
to voluntary departure in Southern California.  See Lopez-Venegas v. Johnson, No. LA CV13-03972 
JAK (PLAx), 2014 WL 12772087 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014).  Pursuant to the agreement, immigration 
officials in Southern California were required to provide detailed information regarding the 
consequences of forgoing a formal hearing in front of an immigration judge, permitted non-citizens to 
use a working phone and provide them with legal information and legal contacts, ceased pressuring 
individuals to accept voluntary return as the only option, and allowed ACLU attorneys to monitor 
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Southern California, 91 No. 34 INTERPRETER RELEASES (Thompson Reuters, Toronto, Can.), Sept. 8, 
2014, at 1597. 
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security.192  The government’s reliance on removal statistics as proof of 
national security is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.  The original 
goal of narrowly identifying and arresting terrorists has been inextricably 
muddled with a broader and comprehensive crackdown on all foreign 
nationals.193  What once looked like a reasonable response to a devastating 
terrorist attack has now become a cure that’s worse than the disease. 
A simple example may prove instructive.  On November 14, 2007, a 
fire broke out in the Anchorage Inn, a historical landmark in New York 
near the U.S.-Canada border.194  Under an agreement between the United 
States and Canada that had been in place since the 1950s, either country 
was able to call on firefighters from across the border for assistance if 
necessary.195  But that night, the Canadian fire truck that arrived at the 
border with their lights flashing was stopped and asked to produce 
identification.196  One of the firefighters whose identification was checked 
had a criminal record, raising doubts about whether he should be allowed 
to cross the border to fight the fire at the Anchorage Inn.197  After eight 
minutes of interrogation, the border patrol agent permitted the firetruck to 
cross, but by the time the truck arrived, the historic Anchorage Inn had 
already burned to the ground.198  As Edward Alden in The Closing of the 
American Border explains: 
The officials at the border saw their responsibility through a single lens, 
which has been reinforced repeatedly since 9/11—keeping bad people 
out of the United States.  But that should not have been the only measure; 
it was equally important that they be able to let good people into the 
country quickly and efficiently.  By failing to do so, it was the United 
States—not Canada, not the firefighters themselves—that paid the 
highest price.199 
In removal proceedings, the foreign national often lacks even the most 
 
 192. For a discussion of the foreign national’s lack of access to legal information, see supra note 
51 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the government’s incentive to remove as many foreign 
nationals as possible with the resources available, see supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text. 
 193. See ALDEN, supra note 33, at 90. 
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Border, CNN (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/14/border.firetruck/ [https://perma.c 
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 195. ALDEN, supra note 33, at 288. 
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 199. Id. at 290 (“The ability of the United States to attract the most ambitious immigrants from 
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basic understanding of the proceedings and is unrepresented by counsel in 
almost all cases.200  This is the paradigm that permits coerced consent cases 
to perpetuate.201  The addition of more immigration attorneys and more 
immigration judges to formally adjudicate the foreign national’s right to 
remain is one possible solution that has been fiercely advocated but would 
come at great expense.202  A lack of resources, crowded immigration 
courts, and overwhelmed immigration judges are well documented.203  A 
compromise, however, might be to require immigration officials to advise 
foreign nationals of their rights more specifically as police officers must 
now do at the time of an arrest pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.204  In the 
not-so-distant past, officers could extort criminal confessions by any 
means necessary.205  Just before Miranda was decided, the police in New 
York “brutally beat, kicked and placed lighted cigarette butts on the back 
of a potential witness under interrogation for the purpose of securing a 
statement incriminating a third party.”206  In response, the Miranda Court 
held as follows: 
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We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to 
permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised 
of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.207 
The Court went on to “encourage Congress and the States to continue 
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our 
criminal laws.”208 
If Congress does not amend the INA to ensure that the foreign 
national’s constitutional and statutory rights are safe from the same type 
of unconstitutional coercive tactics that were present pre-Miranda, courts 
should not shy from enforcing a similar requirement in the removal 
process.  Requiring border patrol agents to translate all documents, advise 
the foreign national of their rights to present evidence at a hearing, their 
right to seek asylum, and their right to post a bond in certain circumstances 
does not offend the purpose of expedited proceedings—it merely informs 
the foreign national of the rights they are sacrificing.  The protection of 
due process and access to legal information may be the most important in 
removal proceedings, as the foreign national is not only forgoing rights he 
or she is unaware of but is one signature away from being forced out of 
the country, with little or no possibility of recourse thereafter.  The finality 
of a coerced consent due process violation is a primary reason why the 
problem perpetuates.  For that reason, and to guarantee the preservation of 
unappealable due process rights, Congress may conclude that every waiver 
of formal removal proceedings should be heard, at least briefly, by an 
immigration judge to confirm that the individual’s waiver was made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and free from coercion.  Despite the backlog that 
currently exists in immigration courts, Justice Harlan, in his Bivens 
concurrence, explained the resource conundrum as follows: 
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days.  
Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on 
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative 
importance of classes of legally protected interests.  And current 
limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from 
budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the way of 
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the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles.209 
The problem of coerced consent in the voluntary departure process is 
unique.  In the case of stipulated removals, federal regulations dictate that 
immigration judges are required to make a factual finding that the foreign 
national is forgoing their right to a hearing knowingly and voluntarily.210  
If the foreign national is subject to expedited removal, federal regulations 
dictate that immigration officials must notify the individual of their right 
to seek asylum211 and make an entire record of the proceedings.212  No such 
protections exist in the realm of voluntary departure—leaving the foreign 
national one signature away from unappealable deportation.  Due to a lack 
of resources and influx of illegal immigration, the increase of summary 
deportations not only increases the likelihood of constitutional violations 
but may begin to reverse the deterrent effect that removals have on future 
illegal reentry offenses, especially when removals are not conducted 
legitimately.213 
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Congress needs to consider coerced consent due process violations 
seriously, and until it does courts should not hesitate to enforce Miranda-
like requirements and a Bivens remedy against individual officers in the 
few cases that do make it to federal court.  Unlike many other areas of law 
where constitutional violations occur, the nature of these violations 
precludes judicial review unless the foreign national is fortunate enough 
to return to the United States and afford an attorney.  The lack of possible 
review for coerced consent violations must serve as an important reminder 
to Congress and courts alike for the necessity to implement meaningful 
change. 
 
curbing illegal immigration, and the statistics appear to be corroborating Gladwell’s theory.  See Lori 
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